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Does Family Size Matter? 
James D. Smith and Guy H. Orcutt 
The progeny of  small families are likely to inherit more wealth than are 
children with greater numbers of  siblings for two rather simple reasons: 
parents of  smaller families  can  save more,  and they  have  fewer  heirs 
among which to leave their accumulated wealth. If  subpopulations such 
as Catholics and blacks have larger than average families and Jews tend 
toward smaller families, this simple demographic fact may have a sub- 
stantial impact on the distribution of  wealth  which is unrelated  to any 
overt or subtle discriminatory behavior of  the dominant population. 
How large are the effects of  family size likely to be? An adequate data 
base to answer the question directly does not exist. We therefore created 
a synthetic population with the characteristics of  the 1962 U.S. popula- 
tion and used a microsimulation system (MASS)  to explore the impor- 
tance of  family size on inherited wea1th.l 
7.1  An Initial Population for Simulating 
the Transmission of  Wealth 
An analysis of  the limited information on inherited  wealth provided 
by  the Survey  of Financial Characteristics of  Consumers  suggests that 
social-economic variables usually measured in field surveys explain very 
little of  the variance in the probability  of  inheriting, or of  the value of 
inherited. wealth  (Projector and Weiss  1966). Age, sex, marital  status, 
income level,  and  occupation  are very  poorly  associated  with  the de- 
pendent variables. The most important and rather obvious predictors  of 
inheritances  are the wealth,  age, and  marital  status  of  one’s surviving 
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parents and the number of  one’s siblings. We are unaware of a data base 
in which these variables are associated with inheritance. 
Although a population has never been measured in a field survey with 
genealogical links among the units  of  observation,  enough information 
existed to build a synthetic population. We started with a sample repre- 
sentation of  the 1960 U.S. population which was ‘grown’ from the 1860 
U.S. Census of  Population by Peabody.2 The 1960 Peabody population 
has  a  limited  set  of  characteristics.  These include  age,  race,  sex,  and 
marital status. The population consists of  1,115 families, and each per- 
son in  each family carries the identity of  his mother, father,  and  chil- 
dren. These relatives  either exist within  the same family,  are members 
of other families in the population, or have died. Thus, it is possible to 
identify at least three generations  of  relatives  within  the  same  sample 
population. When the population was grown Peabody did not have oper- 
ating characteristics  to generate values  for economic variables  such  as 
income, assets, and labor force participation.  This would have required 
historical information at the microlevel which was and is not available. 
The important and unique value of  the Peabody population  is  its genea- 
logic links. 
To utilize the links it was necessary  to superimpose them  on  a con- 
temporary U.S. population  sample containing a sufficiently large set of 
personal characteristics  to  simulate  economic  activity  such as  earning 
and  saving,  and  social behavior  such  as  marriage,  birth,  divorce,  and 
death. All of  this, of  course, was for the purpose of  generating the  ac- 
cumulation of  wealth by individuals in the social context of  families and 
its disbursal upon their  death to their heirs. For this purpose we  chose 
the  1/10,000  1960 Census Public  Use  Sample which had  had wealth 
variables imputed to it.3 
We imposed the genealogical links in the Peabody population  on the 
1960 Public Use Sample in  a manner which  preserved  the  covariance 
between relatives of  the key variables age, sex, race, and marital status. 
The Public Use Sample contained about 7,500 families, while the grown 
1960 population  consisted of  only about  1,100 families. Consequently, 
the genealogical links of  each family in the grown population were used 
an average of about seven times. 
We proceeded  as follows: 
1. Each family in each data base was classified by the age, sex, race, 
and marital status of  its head.-’ 
2.  Heads and wives in families in each data base  were  all classified 
according to their own age, sex, race, and marital status. 
3.  All families in  the Peabody population  were arrayed  into groups 
according to their age, sex, race, and marital status of  their heads. 
4.  All heads and wives  in  the Public Use  Sample were grouped by 
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5. Each family in turn was selected from the Public Use Sample. A 
family was drawn from the appropriate group of  Peabody families 
so that the characteristics of  the heads of  the two families matched. 
The age,  sex, race,  and marital  status  of  the head’s  father  and 
mother  and the wife’s father and mother  in  the Peabody family 
were then used to select individuals from the Public Use Sample to 
be the parents of  the head and wife in the Public Use Sample. 
At the end of  this process we had a file in which each person in the 
1960 Public  Use Sample  “knew”  who were  his mother  and father  or 
child  (up to  10 children), whether  they lived  together  or in  another 
family. 
7.2  Driving the  Initial Population Forward 
The simulation system MASS, for Microanalytic  Simulation System, 
was developed as a broad gauged model with an emphasis on economic 
behavior. For the work reported here we incorporated a “post office” in- 
to it which permits individuals to send one another messages during sim- 
ulation runs.5 
In a MASS simulation,  marriages,  divorces, births,  and deaths take 
place; individuals participate in the labor force and receive income from 
labor, transfers, and wealth. Consumption takes place out of  income and 
family saving occurs (See Orcutt and Glazer  1976). When a death oc- 
curs, relatives of  a decedent are notified of  the  event by messages sent 
through  the post  office.6 
In the real world death and transference of  ownership of  a decedent’s 
wealth impose certain costs upon  an estate  and/or  surviving  relatives. 
The most important of  these are are associated with last illness, burial, 
executors’ and lawyers’ fees. Cost functions for each of  these were esti- 
mated using data from federal estate tax returns and incorporated into 
the simulation model. The estimated parameters for these operating char- 
acteristics  are are shown in  appendix  1. Many decedents’  estates have 
little weaIth to distribute after payment of  these costs of  dying.  This is 
particularly true of  the very young and the old. When  death costs  are 
fully accounted for, some decedents leave negative estates.i 
Wealth transferred from one generation to another may also be eroded 
by death taxes. At the federal level, about 5 percent of  estates are taxed. 
A rough representation  of  the pre-1972 estate tax statute is used in the 
simulations.* 
The simulated events which take place each year are outlined in figure 
7.1. They take place at the individual level. Events and changes in status 
which  take place during a simulation year  are, for  the most  part, sto- 
chastically  determined using  annual probabilities of  occurrence. A  few 
changes, such as age incrementation,  are purely mechanical. POST OFFICE  7 
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In a simulated year the first thing which each person in  each family 
does is to check his “post office box” for messages. In this particular ap- 
plication the messages are limited to information that a relative has died 
or a relative has died and left him assets. 
This information is used in two ways. First, since every person in the 
population keeps a record of  the names of  his living kin, messages about 
the deaths of  relatives  are used  to update their records,  which we  can 
think of  as electronic family  bible^.^ Secondly, when one finds a relative 
died and bequeathed him wealth, he takes it and adds it to his own as- 
sets and to those of  his family if  he is the head or wife in a family. (All 
wealth owned by married persons in our simulated world is shared equal- 
ly  with their spouses.)  Wealth inherited  by  children  living at home is 
kept by them and not considered as part of  the family’s wealth. By the 
same token, when a child leaves home he takes only his own wealth. 
After checking his post office box for information, a person’s age is 
incremented. He or she is then given a chance of  giving birth, dependent 
upon sex, marital status, age, race, education, number of  children born, 
and parity (see Orcutt, Glazer, Jaramillo, and Nelson  1976). 
The next step in the simulation is the assignment of  death.  If  death 
occurs, a message is put into the post office box of  “known” relatives of 
the decedent. An estate is set up and probated.  The estate begins with 
the decedent’s net worth at the time of  death. From this the cost of last 
illness  is  subtracted  (see  appendix). The estate  of  each decedent  is 
charged with the cost of  a funeral, and the fees of  executors and lawyers 
are calculated and charged against it as well. 
Finally, an estate tax is levied. It provides for a  $100,000 personal 
exemption after the above costs have been subtracted, The value of the 
estate after the exemption is treated as the taxable estate. The tax rates 
used  are a function of  the size of  the taxable estate and are computed 
as follows: 
ESTRATE =  .05 +  .015(TXBLEST’/10,000) 
+  .02 (TXBLEST”/ 100,000) 
+  .03  (TXBLEST”’/l,000,000) 
where  TXBLEST’  is  the value  of  the taxable  estate under  $100,000; 
TXBLEST” is the value of  the taxable estate from $100,000 to $999,- 
999 and TXBLEST ’I’  is the value of  the estate in excess of  $999,999. 
For example, a taxable estate of  $1,200,000 would have  a tax  rate of 
40.6%  (.05 +  .15 +  .20 +  .006). 
After the taxable  estate has been  reduced by the estate tax,  the re- 
maining estate is distributed to heirs according to the following devolu- 
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1. If there  is  a  surviving spouse,  the  entire distributable  estate  de- 
2.  If there  is  no surviving spouse, the distributable estate is divided 
3. If  there are neither children nor spouse surviving, the distributable 
4.  If  there are neither children, spouse, nor parents surviving, the dis- 
We will not describe the remainder of  the general simulation of MASS 
outlined in figure 7.1. The reader is referred  to Orcutt et al.  (1976) for 
a complete description of  the other operating characteristics. 
Our hypothesis that children with fewer siblings receive larger paren- 
tal  wealth  bequests  than  do children  with  more siblings follows  from 
the reasoning that other things being equal, parents with fewer children 
save more, and wealth is passed  to surviving children  in equal shares. 
Although this proposition has face and some empirical validity, it is sel- 
dom noted in the wealth distribution literature, and its importance vis- 
A-vis  other factors is unknown. 
In table 7.1 the simulated amounts bequeathed and received by  per- 
sons with different numbers of  siblings is  shown  for twelve years. We 
denote the period of  the simulation as  1960 to 1972. The interpretation 
of  the simulation, however,  is  not  dependent  upon  its  alignment  with 
some historical period. The results are most appropriately thought of as 
belonging to an interval of  lapsed time, rather than a period of  history. 
It should be noted in table 7.1 that the results of  the first simulation 
year (1960) show the value of  bequests to be several times greater than 
the inheritances received. In a society in which wealth is increasing and 
there is a lag between the time when a person dies and the time his heirs 
inherit, there is a tendency for inheritances in a year to be less than be- 
quests. The great difference shown for 1960, however, is largely mechani- 
cal, reflecting the fact that in the first year  of  the simulation  everyone 
in the population had a chance of  dying and bequeathing an estate, but 
no one had a chance of  inheriting from a relative who died in year t-1. 
Once the simulation  is underway, the amounts bequested and inherited 
begin to converge. 
The most striking information provided by the table is the concentra- 
tion  of  inheritance  in  persons with  no  more  than  three  siblings.  The 
values shown are in billions of  dollar amounts of  the inheritance. There 
are, of  course, bequests to persons with greater numbers of  siblings, but 
bequests with positive  values are offset by  negative  bequests.  A  nega- 
tive bequest comes about because  a decedent leaves little or no wealth 
and the costs of  last illness and funeral expenses are “inherited” by his 
kin. This is clearly the real world situation for decedents who are young 
children  and for a reasonable number of  decedents who are unmarried 
volves to the spouse. 
evenly among surviving children. 
estate passes equally to the decedent’s surviving parents. 
tributable estate goes into the kitty.1° Table 7.1  Value of  Annual and Cumulative Bequests and Inheritance by Number of  Siblings of  Benefactors and Inheritors over a 
Simulated 12-Year Period (amounts in billions  of  dollars) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966 
No.of Siblings  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum. 
















































































































24.9  58.5 
11.9  30.0 
5.9  7.6 
-0.1  -0.3 
0.3  0.8 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.2 
0.7  0.8 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.2 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.2 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 











































24.5  94.0 
11.5  58.9 
6.0  13.6 
-0.1  -0.6 
0.5  2.2 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.4 
0.0  1.3 
0.0  0.0 
-0.2  -0.4 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.2 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
23.0  117.0 
16.5  75.4 
8.6  22.3 
-0.1  -0.7 
-0.1  2.1 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.4 
0.1  1.4 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.5 
0.2  0.2 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.2 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
23.1  140.2 
14.4  89.8 
2.3  24.6 
-0.1  -0.8 
0.7  2.8 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.5 
0.0  1.4 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.5 
0.0  0.2 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.2 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.2 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 Table 7.1-continued 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
No.of Siblings  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum.  Year  Cum. 
0-1  siblings 
Bequests  21.7 
Inheritance  19.7 
Kitty  2.9 
2 siblings 
Bequests  -0.1 
Inheritance  0.3 
Kitty  0.0 
3 siblings 
Bequests  -0.1 
Inheritance  0.0 
Kitty  0.0 
4 siblings 
Bequests  -0.1 
Inheritance  0.1 
Kitty  0.0 
5 siblings 
Bequests  -0.2 
Inheritance  0.0 
Kitty  0.0 
6 siblings 
Bequests  0.0 
Inheritance  0.0 
Kitty  0.0 
7 or more siblings 
Bequests  -0.1 
Inheritance  -0.1 
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11.1  173.1 
17.3  126.9 
0.3  27.8 
-0.4  -1.3 
0.7  3.8 
-0.2  -0.2 
0.0  -0.6 
0.0  1.3 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.7 
0.0  0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.4 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.2  -0.4 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.2 
0.0  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
35.7  208.7 
14.5  141.3 
7.1  34.9 
-0.1  -1.4 
0.1  3.9 
0.0  -0.2 
-0.1  -0.7 
0.0  1.3 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.8 
0.0  0.1 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.4 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.4 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.2 
0.0  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
18.9  227.6 
24.6  165.9 
1.4  36.4 
-0.2  -1.6 
-0.1  3.8 
0.0  -0.2 
-0.4  -1.2 
0.2  1.5 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.8 
0.0  0.1 
0.0  0.0 
-0.3  -0.8 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.4 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.3 
0.0  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
26.6  254.3 
12.9  178.8 
5.4  41.7 
-0.2  -1.8 
0.3  4.2 
-0.1  -0.2 
-0.6  -1.8 
0.5  2.0 
-0.1  -0.1 
0.0  -0.8 
0.1  0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.8 
0.1  0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.4 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.3  -0.5 
0.0  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
14.8  269.1 
21.6  200.5 
-0.2  41.5 
-0.3  -2.1 
1.7  5.9 
-0.1  -0.3 
-0.1  -1.8 
-0.1  1.9 
0.0  -0.1 
-0.3  -1.1 
-0.2  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.8 
0.0  0.1 
0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.5 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.2  -0.7 
0.0  -0.1 
0.0  0.0 
Note: The initial population has characteristics  which have been aligned with that of the US. population in 1960, but the intent here is not 
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children living away from home.  In the simulation, when these individ- 
uals died the negative value of  their distributable estate was sent to their 
surviving parents. Elderly persons who died during the simulation were 
also frequently poor. The negative value of  their estates was bequeathed 
to their  surviving  spouse  or  children.  As  noted  above,  life  insurance 
contracts are not included in the model  at this time. Their inclusion is 
likely to make  considerable difference in  the value and distribution of 
intergenerational transfers. The same would be true of  health insurance, 
and to a much  smaller extent, Social Security death benefits.*l To fur- 
ther illustrate the importance of  number  of  siblings on the level of  in- 
herited  wealth, we produced  a simple cross-tabulation,  shown here  in 
table 7.2. In the table there is a definite inverse relation between number 
of  siblings and amount of  inherited wealth. Ninety-four  percent of per- 
sons who inherited $15,000 or more over  the twelve-year period  were 
either only children or had one sibling. Only about one percent of  those 
who had three siblings inherited  $15,000 or more in  the same period. 
For practical purposes, virtually all persons with four or more siblings, 
i.e., from families with five or more children, inherited less than $1,000 
in  the twelve years  of  simulation. It should be kept  in mind  that the 
probability of  inheriting anything in  a given year is not very great.  In 
a given year about one percent of  the population  dies. If  each decedent 
had an average of  four survivors unrelated to any other decedent, only 
about four percent of  the surviving population would receive an inheri- 
tance  (including a negative or zero-valued inheritance). One would like 
to look  at lifetime inheritance to better understand  the  importance  of 
of  family size for ultimate wealth status. Work is progressing to run sim- 
ulations of  one-hundred-years’ duration to further the exploratory efforts 
presented here. 
Table 7.2  Percent Distribution by  Value of  Inheritance and Number of 
Siblings after Twelve Years of  Simulation (row %/column  %) 
Amount Inherited 
No. of  $1,000  $3,000  $5,000 
Siblings  < $1,000  <  $3,000  <  $5,000  <  $15,000  2 $15,000 
0-  1  92.6/59.7  1.2/87.1  0.7A7.2 
2  98.4110.5  0.1/  1.4  0.1/  1.2 
3  98.6/10.8  0.7/  8.2  0.1/  2.3 
4  99.51  9.0  O.O/  0.0  0.51  9.3 
5  99.4/  4.7  0.6/  3.4  O.O/  0.0 
6  100.0/  2.4  0.01  0.0  O.O/  0.0 
7 or more  100.0/  2.8  O.O/  0.0  O.O/  0.0 
2.6/93.9  2.9/94.2 
0.7/  4.1  0.7/  3.9 
0.3/ 2.0  0.31 1.8 
o.o/  0.0  0.01 0.0 
o.o/  0.0  0.01  0.0 
o.o/  0.0  o.o/  0.0 
o.o/  0.0  o.o/  0.0 282  James D. SmiWGuy H. Orcutt 
Appendix 
Cost of  Last Illness 
Nearly all deaths impose medical  costs  on the estates of  decedents. 
Where there is a prolonged  terminal illness,  the medical costs may  be 
substantial. The deductibility of  these costs for purposes  of  calculating 
taxable estate on the federal  estate tax return provided  a data base  to 
estimate the relation of  the cost of  last illness to other characteristics of 
decedents. The cost of  last illness was estimated using AID-III.12 
In figure  7.A.1 the  result  of  the  AID analysis  is  shown.  The five 
final groups explain 5.4 percent of  the variance in the cost of  terminal 
illnesses as reported on federal estate tax returns. One would not expect 
to explain a great deal of  the variance with the variables available to US, 
but there is  a systematic, positive  relationship between  net  worth  and 
cost of  last illness. The only other variable which contributed significant- 
ly to reducing the original variance was age of  decedent. Thus, only these 
two characteristics of  decedents were used in the attribution of  last ill- 
ness costs.  The actual attribution of  the cost  was unsophisticated; the 
expected value was assigned within each characteristic class. 
Attorneys’ Fees 
Attorneys’ fees are a deductible item in the federal estate tax. Conse- 
quently, they are available from the estate tax return.  When AID was 
used to split the population  into groups such that a regression  of  attor- 
neys’ fees on gross estate within groups would produce the greatest re- 
duction of  variance  relative to a regressions  on the total set  of obser- 
vations,  51.1 percent  of  the variance was  explained. Age  and  marital 
status of  decedent were the only other variables which were able to pro- 
vide a basis for splitting the population  with  a  significant reduction  in 
variance. In figure 7.A.2 it can be seen that a simple regression of  attor- 
neys’  fees  on gross  assets  (measured  in  thousands  of  dollars)  would 
produce coefficients of a =  $549, b =  15.66.  The predicted value $3,645 
is the expected attorneys’ fee when the mean value of  the group’s gross 
assets ($198,000) is plugged into the equation. 
Executors’ Fees 
tions and data from the 1962 federal estate tax file. 
The cost of  executors’ fees was estimated using two regression  equa- 
EXCOM =  u +  bl  (NETWORTH) +  bz  (MS1) 
+  b, (MS2) +  b4  (MS3) 
where net worth is measured in thousands of  dollars, MSl  is  a dummy 
for married decedents  MS2 is  a dummy for never  married  decedents, 283  The Intergenerational Transmission of  Wealth 
Net WonhcR2.000.000 
m  =  947 
II  = 3.3hX 
and MS3 is a dummy for all other marital statuses. The equation was fit- 
ted separately for decedents with net worth under $200,000 and those 
with net worth of  $200,000 or more. The estimated coefficients for the 
two equations are given in table 7.A.1: 
Net Worth;$?.000.000 
,,, = 2.022 
I1  =  301 
I  !I  ~  3.669  I 
Net Worth<X500.000  5500 ,000.r N e  t  Worth  e:  $2  .OOU ,000 
111  ~  XhZ  It1  = I.Ilh 
li = 2.241  I, =  1.125 
-~  ~ 
_~__ 
Age;.  70  Age‘  70 
111  = I  .770  ,)I :  ?.X3X 
,,=  270  I,  =  71 
Fig. 7.A.1  Medical Expenses of  Last  Illness  (rn = mean  cost in dol- 
lars). Variation  e  explained equals 5.4%. Sex  was an eli- 
gible in variance. 
S?.M)O.OOO\Net  Worlh~.$5.000.000 
ltl =  I.53X 
I1  =  1x4 
Net Wonh,’b5.0.000 
,)I  ~  2.696 
I,  ~  46 Age >  =  75 
(4,002) = 1,201 + 13.35 (210) 
n = 1,813 
Fig. 7.A.2  Attorneys’ Fees AID with Regression on Gross Estate (dol- 
lars) . The overall  regression  R2  equals  46.8%.  Marginal 
variance explained  by  subgroup regressions  equals  4.3 % . 
Total R2  equals  5  1  .I % . Sex was  also  an eligible variable 
but  could  not  produce a  significant  reduction  in  variance. 
The predicted  value  of  the equation in each group is the 
value of  attorneys’ fees estimated  when  gross  estate  mea- 
sured in thousands of  dollars was at its mean for the group. 
Age < 75 
(3,350) = 220 + 19.03 (188) 
n = 2,200 Age 3 75 
(1.474) =  1,308 + 0.814 (205) 
I1  = 1,813 
Fig. 7.A.3 
Age < 75 
(I  ,652) = 1,237 + 2.397 (173) 
11  = 2.200 
Funeral Expenses AID with Regression on Net Worth. The 
overall regression  R2 equals 9.3%.  Marginal variance ex- 
plained  by  subgroup  regression  equals  9.9%.  Total  R2 
equals  19.2%.  The dependent  variable  in  parentheses  is 
the  estimated  value  of  funeral  expenses  when  the  inde- 
pendent  variable  in  parentheses,  net  worth  measured  in 
thousands of  dollars, is at the mean for the group. 
Married 
( 1.682) = 1,398 
+ 1.643 (173) 
ri = 1.571 
Other 
( 1.579) = 878 
+ 4.043 (173) 
n = 629 
12 
Net Worth 
3 $ I,000.000 
(2.214) = 888 
+ 0.712 (1,863) 
II = 41 
6  7 
Net Worth  Net Worth 
2  $150,000  i  $150,000 
(2.073) = 1.600 
+ 1.336 (354) 
II = 480 
(1.510) = 844 
+ 7.139 (93) 
11  = 1,091 
A 
Net Worth < $1,ooO,O00 
(1,458) = 1,118 
4  2.043 (166) 
rf  = 1.772 
Age < 65 
(1,477) = 1,175 
II = 240 
Age 65 < 75 
( 1,642) = 768 
4  1.846(163)  + 4.866 (180) 
II = 389 
Widowed. divorced, 
separated 
11.392) =  1.170  - 1.359(164) 
I1  = 933 
Married, never 
married 
(1,530) = 1,058 
ri = 839 
(1.417) = 1,175 
* 2.802 (169)  1.898 (127) 286  James D. Smith/Guy H. Orcutt 
Table 7.A.l  Estimated Cost of Executors’ Fees 
Net Worth 
<  $200,000  2 $200,000 
a  $172.50  $2,517.80 
14.8  17.3 
b2  -843.5  -3,575.0 
b,  575.5  4,223.4 
268.0  - 648.1 




In the simulation,  funeral  expenses  are  attributed  to decedents’  es- 
tates on the basis of  eight regression equations fitted in the process of an 
AID run on the 1962 estate tax file. The combined splitting of  the popu- 
lation into eight final groups,  and the simple regression  of  funeral  ex- 
penses on net worth within  each final group, explained 19.2 percent of 
the variance of  funeral expenses. In figure 7.A.3 we show the results of 
the AID run with group regressions. 
In some cases, the total costs of  dying exceed the assets of  the dece- 
dent. This is frequently the case with children. Although their estates will 
not generally incur legal or  administration  fees of  any significance, the 
cost of  last illness  and funeral will  diminish  them  as well as those of 
adults. Whether for a child or for an adult, the costs of  last illness, ad- 
ministration  fees,  lawyers’ fees,  and funeral expenses are all  deducted 
from the estate in accordance with the AID analyses above. When these 
costs result in a negative estate, it is transferred  to the decedent’s  heirs 
in the same manner as a positive valued estate.  This conceptualization 
is consistent with the actual process of  cost bearing for decedents. 
Notes 
1.  MASS  (Microanalytic Simulation  System) was  developed  through  the  joint 
efforts of  a number of  researchers over a longer period of  time than we  have had 
funds to simulate.  The principal  contributor  and father of  the  model  is  Orcutt. 
Smith  designed  and implemented  the  “post  office”  software  which  permits  indi- 
viduals  to send  messages  to  one another while  the system  is  running  and in the 
application presented here to bequeath wealth to their heirs. The basic MASS soft- 
ware system was designed and implemented under the direction of  Amihai Glazer. 
See  Orcutt and  Glazer  (1976)  for a  general  description  of  MASS,  and  Orcutt, 
Glazer, Jaramillo, and Nelson  ( 1976b)  for a programmer’s  perspective. 287  The Intergenerational Transmission of  Wealth 
2.  The growth  of  the  1860 sample population  to  1960 was carried  out  several 
years  ago  by  Gerald  Peabody  at  the  Urban  Institute  using  DYNASIM.  For  a 
description of  DYNASIM see Orcutt, et al.,  1976a. 
3.  Using the 1962 Survey of Financial  Characteristics of  Consumers to estimate 
income-wealth relationships  by  demographic  characteristics,  Smith  and  Franklin 
had  imputed to  a  1960 Public  Use  Sample  a  set of  asset  and liability  variables. 
See Smith, Franklin, and Orcutt 1977. 
4.  We also attempted  to use measures of  family size and numbers  of  children, 
but  these proved to be  ineffective. 
5. The post  office is  technically  an array  with  elements  for  storing  messages. 
The element subscripts are the IDS of all persons in the initial  population plus  all 
IDS for children born during the simulation period. 
6.  In  the work  presented  here messages are sent only  to parents and children. 
We  have  also limited  the  distribution  of  bequests  to parents  and  children.  The 
model is capable of  transmitting messages and bequests  to siblings, uncles,  aunts, 
grandparents, great grandparents, and cousins, but the evidence suggests that very 
little bequeathed wealth moves beyond the radius of  spouse, children, and parents. 
7.  We  have  not  incorporated  life  insurance  contracts  into  the  model  at  this 
time.  It is  expected  that  including  life  insurance  policies  will  reduce  the  rather 
large number of  decedents we  find with negatively valued  estates. 
8.  Implementing death costs and taxes into the model  represents work  in prog- 
ress. In  the present  application of  the model,  alignment of  these observable costs 
is not critical  so long as  our approximations  do not distort  the  relationships  we 
wish  to  measure,  namely,  the  importance  of  number  of  siblings  and  inherited 
wealth. 
9.  In the current implementation each person in the population  carries with him 
the names of  up to ten persons who are related to him as mother, father or child. 
With  this amount  of  information  it is possible to find his  brothers  and his  sisters 
and his uncles and aunts. 
10. The kitty represents all other heirs including both collateral relatives,  chari- 
table organizations and governments. 
11. In  an earlier  simulation  experiment  by  Smith,  Franklin, and Orcutt  1977 
using a one-year period, life insurance was modeled  as part of  the financial  char- 
acteristics of  persons. In a simulation model which runs over many years, not only 
must the initial distribution of  insurance risk be modeled, but the operating charac- 
teristics  which  generate  purchases,  lapses  and cash surrender  value  must  also be 
implemented. This work  is  on our  research  agenda, but  is  at least  a year  away 
from completion. 
12. AID-I11 is a data-searching algorithm which  sequentially splits a population 
into pairs such that the sum of  the variance  around the mean  of  the pair or the 
expected value of  a regression  is the  smallest possible  proportion  of  the variance 
around the  expected  values  of  the group from which  the  pair  was  derived.  The 
technique  has the advantage over regression  in not requiring an additive set of in- 
dependent variables.  It also imposes no linearity restrictions on  relations  between 
variables. For a detailed discussion of  AID-111 see Sonquist,  1971. 288  James D. Smith/Guy H. Orcutt 
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